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The Case for Continuation of Mandatory Independent Audits
For Publicly Held Companies
John C. Burton
Securities and Exchange Commission*
W h e n I was asked to speak on this topic I w i l l have to admit that I did
not initially view it as a hot one. Nevertheless, it d i d seem desirable to look
once again at the somewhat strange phenomenon called an audit by an independent public accountant to see whether or not the conventional wisdom which
asserts its necessity is justified.
H o w M u c h Independence?
T h e first question to be considered is whether or not, i n fact, we want
totally independent audits. Here I think the answer is probably no. Independence
does not necessarily lead to assurance, and absolute independence, which would
require elimination of all dependence on communication w i t h clients, would
be bad news indeed. T h e ultimate independent audit would be where the
auditor arrives on the scene, is handed the financial statements and the books,
and talks w i t h no one w i t h i n the company. I think we could agree that such
an audit would very likely be a rather bad one since an audit depends on candid
communication between auditor and client i n order for the auditor to develop
the necessary thorough knowledge of the company and its business which he
must combine with a knowledge of the accounting measurement model.
What we do want, therefore, instead of absolute independence is a dispassionate unbiased professional review of financial statements. In addition,
we expect auditors to be proficient i n the measurement and communication of
financial information, and to assist their clients as necessary to insure adequate
reporting to the public.
Parties at Interest
A s indicated above, an audit is a rather strange creature and not at all the
way i n which it is perceived by most outsiders. In an overwhelming majority
of cases, the audit is essentially a cooperative effort because the interests of
management, the auditor, and the public coincide. In these engagements the
* T h e Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility
for any private publication by any of its employees. T h e views expressed herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's
colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
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auditor has as his principal responsibility a review of the adequacy of financial
information systems of the firms w i t h emphasis on the needs of the outside
investor. I n this review, the auditor should also be aware of the information
needs of management and, as necessary, make appropriate recommendations to
improve management's control of operations. T h e auditor's role then is twofold
—attestation and consultation. T h e auditor uses his professional skills and absence of bias to bear public witness to the reliability of financial information
included i n an annual report to shareholders and to work w i t h management
to improve the usefulness of the financial information system for both external
and internal reporting purposes.
It is worth noting that i n a cooperative audit engagement even a bad audit
does not have a very high social cost because when the financial statements
prepared by the client do present fairly the results of operations, an audit deficiency w i l l not result i n misleading data being given to the public. It may be
that total stockholder information falls a bit short of what it could be and that
the audit fee is largely wasted, but these are minor compared to the potentially
major costs that way arise if deficient audits coexist with managements who
are trying to obscure the reality of their operation.
W h i l e an audit is normally a cooperative effort, perhaps 5 % of the time
adversary conditions arise. These are situations i n which the interests of management and the public are diverse, where there are benefits to management
from a process of reporting other than the full and fair results of operations.
These are the tough audits, where the auditor more than earns his fee and has
trouble collecting it. In these circumstances the auditor has the principal role
of arbitration between the interests of management and the public, and i n such
cases he must always remember that he serves the public first. H e must avoid
the situation i n which the public perceives it has been cheated as a consequence
of deficient financial reporting because abuses of this sort carry a very high cost.
Economic Considerations
After considering the nature of the audit, we must next test its economic
utility. In this connection the cost of audits of public companies i n the United
States is not difficult to measure. It has been estimated to be between $750
million and a billion dollars per annum. T h i s is not a small figure and the
question that must be answered is whether the value to society justifies the cost.
The benefits from audit services, however, are harder to quantify. A s a
starting point there are the benefits of improved financial information systems
which result from the auditor's review and suggestions. F o r most companies
the auditor also contributes to improved external financial reporting procedures
and results; presumably he improves the communication process between management and investors. Finally, the auditor contributes significantly to the
avoidance of abuse and, as previously indicated, the cost of abuse is very high.
T h i s service helps keep the company out of trouble, protects the board of
directors, and builds the confidence of investors.
Confidence is a key to good markets. Analysts and other investors must be
confident that the numbers on w h i c h they base their investment decisions are
realistic within the framework of the accounting model or they w i l l be reduced
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to a feeling of being a part of a random process without knowing what is being
done to them.
In the final analysis, the weighing of costs and benefits must represent a
subjective judgment. T h e number of independent audits was growing prior to
the Securities Acts and it can therefore be inferred that, at least for many
companies, a hard-nosed market judgment justified the cost of an audit. I
believe this case is stronger today than it was at that time, but since there is no
definitive evidence or answer, one must have Faith—as I do.
Should There be Change?
If we agree that the principle of audits is a worthwhile one, we should
explore next the question of whether or not things should be done differently.
A number of suggestions have been made that perhaps there is a better alternative to the current approach of having independent accountants perform the
audit function. Some have suggested that this should be a role for Government.
Although i n my current position I have developed a respect for the role of
Government i n the market place, I am not convinced this is the right answer.
Government audits might be cheaper. I believe, however, that they would not
be as creative, nor would they be as effective i n avoiding abuses. A Government
audit almost by its very nature is an adversary audit and the record of adversary
audits i n catching abuses is not very good. Such an audit discourages cooperation, which is still the key to most audits. W h i l e the auditors of the Internal
Revenue Service, the Defense Contract A u d i t Agency, and the General Accounti n g Office achieve many successes, their overall record also shows the major
difficulties which arise when the auditee is steadfastly trying to avoid w o r k i n g
with the auditor. I believe, therefore, that Congress was wise i n rejecting the
idea of Government audits of companies offering their securities i n the public
market place.
Another possibility is to create an audit function within the corporation.
The A u d i t Committee of the Board of Directors or some other internal source
might supervise an internally performed function. I think, however, that it is
apparent that not only would such auditors tend to lack breadth of expertise
which comes to independent public accountants through experience with many
companies, but this approach would also be defective i n those cases where management had reason for advocacy—at the bottom 5 % of the cases where the
auditor is most tested. T h i s leaves us then w i t h independent accountants, who
I think can justify the faith which has been placed i n them.
If we mutually agree that things should not be done differently, we should
then consider the question of who should select the auditor. There have been
numerous suggestions that if an outside party such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the N e w Y o r k Stock Exchange were to select auditors they
would not be so dependent upon the economic market place, and would be able
to be more independent and less subject to the pressures of management. Once
again, however, we can get to the question of whether the cost i n terms of lack
of cooperation i n such audits would be greater than the benefits created by the
lack of relationship. I a m not persuaded that the benefits of such a system
outweigh the very substantial problems that coexist with it.
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Finally, there are questions raised as to who should pay for audits. Many
of those suggesting that auditors be appointed by outside agencies also suggest
some pooling of resources to pay audit fees. They suggest a N e w Y o r k Stock
Exchange fee or some other device by which a pool of funds w i l l be generated.
W h i l e this again has some appeal, since the economic relationship between the
auditor and his clients is one of the principal problems of outward appearance
that exists, I am doubtful that it would be an improvement. T h e discipline of
the market place is still beneficial i n the audit world, and an auditor who d i d
not have a responsibility to his client to do a good job i n economic terms might
well tend to over-audit. W e should not encourage a steady increase i n procedures simply because money is available. W h i l e there are problems w i t h the
current fee arrangements, I think that they represent as good a solution as any
that have currently been proposed.
Increasing Auditors' Rights
If we are to continue to operate w i t h i n the current broad framework then
we must determine what changes might be made to improve the quality of audit
work and avoid perceived problems. I n the first place, a number of things can
be done to increase auditors' rights. W h i l e I would hesitate to suggest tenure, it
would seem that a longer period of appointment might be beneficial. It is well
k n o w n that during the first year of an audit, auditors generally absorb some
significant nonrecurring costs. If the auditor could be assured of three, four
or five years of audit relationships some economic pressures that might otherwise
exist could be avoided.
Secondly, auditors should be given the right to attend meetings of the
board of directors and stockholders of corporations. Corporate policy is set at
directors' meetings and if the auditor is to be fully apprised of what is going
on and if his services are to be most productively used, his attendance at such
meetings would be beneficial. Stockholders' meetings are generally attended by
auditors today and the availability of the auditor to answer stockholders' questions, as well as to make a statement i f necessary, seems desirable.
T h i r d , there should be increasing pressure for mandatory audit committees
comprised of board members to w h o m the auditor w i l l have a direct channel
of communication. T h i s is not only a protection to the board but also an i m portant right for the auditor since he is able to deal with members of the board
on a continuing institutionalized basis.
Fourth, it might be desirable to permit the auditor to communicate directly
to the shareholders whenever he feels it is necessary for h i m to do so. W h i l e
such communications would be infrequent, it seems an appropriate lightning
rod and device by which auditors could encourage greater corporate disclosure
when they felt it was necessary. Such a right might be implemented by a change
i n the SEC's proxy rules to require management to make a section i n the proxy
statement available to the auditor to enable h i m to make any statement to the
stockholders which he feels necessary under the circumstances.
Finally, the auditor should have certain rights i n regard to the disclosure
of his dismissal. O u r 8-K requirements currently represent a significant step
forward i n this regard, but it may be that they should be extended to require
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disclosure i n a proxy statement or annual report any time an auditor is changed.
In addition, it might be that some public notice of auditor change should be
required of any corporation beyond the simple 8-K requirement to report the
hiring of a new auditor.
Some Accompanying Added Obligations
If auditors are to have more rights as I recommend, they should also recognize additional obligations. In this regard I believe that there is a need for
increased use of the attest function. Auditors should be prepared, for example,
to attest i n some fashion to a company's internal control system and perhaps to
forecasts or projections.
In addition, the concept of auditor of public record needs development.
Under this concept, the auditor has a continuing responsibility to review all
public communications to investors and shareholders on a timely basis—not
with the objective of performing an audit on interim and other data but to
provide assurance that audited financial results are not being misused i n press
releases and annual reports and to be certain that accounting and measurement
problems have been adequately aired prior to the publication of interim reports
and other announcements. It is apparent that substantial work must be done i n
the development of standards i n this area but the concept seems to be one which
is growing i n acceptance.
Evolutionary, Not Revolutionary Change
In the final analysis then, this re-examination of the role of the auditor has
not created a cry for revolutionary change. Rather, I believe that evolution of
the auditor's role is essential and that the opportunities are very great for i n creased social service and function by the public accounting profession. Such
increased opportunities should result both i n increased revenues and increased
responsibilities. A s we see the tremendous growth i n accounting enrollments
i n schools of business today, we can perhaps take pleasure i n the fact that students are voting with their careers for a broader accounting function. If the
profession avoids the paralysis which fear of liability can bring it and is prepared
to see its role evolve, then both the public and the profession w i l l be well served.
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